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A LEONTIEF MODEL OF MUNICIPAL BUDGETING
Phillip J. Bryson, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah, USA
ABSTRACT
Local budgeting in transition countries is an important process because it can reveal the extent to which
fiscal decentralization has occurred. Because central planning regimes were highly centralized, adopting
a market/democratic approach requires a devolution of power from the central government to regions and
municipalities. A Leontief model is presented as a simple theoretical approach to local budgeting. Local
revenues are considered as financial inputs and local expenditures as financial outputs. A method of
measuring the degree of local autonomy as a part of the budgeting process is a part of this model.
Keywords: public sector decentralization, subnational government autonomy, Leontief model
1. INTRODUCTION
Because of the importance of fiscal
decentralization in the local finance systems of
the transition countries of east and central
Europe, it would be helpful to understand how
decisions are made and what constraints are
binding upon those decisions in the process of
preparing and implementing municipal budgets.
Planning processes for effective allocation of
whatever revenues a city may anticipate,
whether that city be rather large or quite small,
will have common characteristics. At the same
time, in cities where an effort is underway to
overcome the excessive centralization of a
central planning legacy, there will be some
unique characteristics associated with the
process. This is the case for the transition
countries, which have spent nearly two decades
attempting to establish anew the principle of
local government autonomy.
Under the Marxist-Leninist regime of central
planning, all governance decisions were made
at the center by the party for the cities and
towns. Peripheral local governments had only
one role to play, which was to carry out
delegated tasks (přenesené působnosti) of
“state administration” (státní správa) assigned to
them by the central government. The point of
fiscal decentralization, ostensibly the objective of
the Republic since 1990, is to achieve local selfgovernment (samospráva) with greater local
autonomy.
The present paper will review the process of
local budgeting in the Czech and Slovak
Republics, which are ideally suited for a
comparative study. The two republics were
paternalistically joined under communism,
becoming a federation after the Prague Spring

of 1968. When the Velvet Revolution came in
1989, the two countries began their joint
transition to a democratic market orientation by
modifying their fiscal systems, ostensibly to
provide for greater local autonomy.
They
established joint legislation and institutions for
their financial systems which were in place when
the Velvet Divorce set them on separate paths in
1993.
For some time they retained the
legislation and institutions with which they began
the transition, but before joining the EU in 2004,
they each pursued reforms of public
administration as a part of the accession
process. With these reforms they began their
first substantive divergence from their common
beginnings. The deviation from the common
path was undertaken primarily by the Republic
of Slovakia, which initiated reforms in local
finance that began to produce divergent financial
outcomes beginning with the year 2005. At the
end of the common transition era, then, we will
evaluate Czech/Slovak local budgeting for the
last time in which the historic similarities will
have been so great.
The actual budgeting process, i.e., the
mechanical protocols followed to bring local
budgets into existence, is not the focus of this
paper. It is straightforward and can be explained
succinctly as Sedmihradska and Klazart (2005)
have done. The municipality’s budget officer
sends instructions to the heads of departments,
prepares revenue estimates and receives
submitted reports from the department heads.
The investment department prepares the capital
budget. Requests are discussed and negotiated
with department heads. After adjustments are
made, the requests are summarized and
become a part of a proposed budget for
discussion by the budget officer, department
heads and now the municipal manager, mayor,
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council and advisory bodies, leading to the
publication of the budget proposal. The budget
becomes effective upon approval by the council.
The general concept of local budgeting stems
back to the early 1900s movement in the United
States to bring uniform accounting methods and
general efficiency to local government, including
transparency, uniformity of methods, standard
accounting and cost accounting, intercity cost
comparisons, and effectiveness assessments to
local government (Mullins and Pagano, 2005).
That includes, of course, the municipal
forecasting that would rationalize and strengthen
the early stages of the budgeting process
(Forrester, 1991) in the twin republics.
The literature on local finance developments in
the Czech and Slovak Republics (Sedmihradská
and Klazar, 2005; International Monetary Fund,
2004) demonstrates secular progress since the
beginning of the transition period. There was
much to overcome in the legacies of public
sector finance from the era of central planning
and a good deal of progress has been made in
the past fifteen years in implementing improved
methods. There has been motivation from inside
the twin republics and also incentives and
assistance offered from the outside, especially
from the European Union, to adopt and become
proficient in utilizing appropriate budgeting
techniques. The EU has assisted by promoting
reforms of public administration in the course of
accession.
An example of reform developments that should
be mentioned in this regard are multi-year,
rolling budget processes recently adopted in
both the Czech and Slovak Republics. Zachar
(2004) reports on this and other reform efforts
undertaken by the Slovak Republic to meet the
requirements of the acquis communautaire
before accession to the European Union. Under
the new system introduced into law in Slovakia
in January of 2005, local governments no longer
receive their annual allocation from the national
tax revenue as an announcement (usually quite
late) published in the State Budget Act. The new
system was designed to stabilize the flow of
revenues in the long run and permit multipleyear financial planning (Ministry of Finance, SR,
2004, p. 31). The new “multi-annual budgeting”
features a three-year time frame and creates a
link between the term of service of elected
municipal and regional councils and the
budgetary period. This permits more long-term

financial commitments on the part of
municipalities and regions. Revenues and
expenditures for budget years two and three
under this system are not obligatory and may be
adjusted in the next three-year budget appearing
the
following
year.
Similar
institutional
arrangements have been developed and
implemented in the Czech Republic (Hrabalová,
2005).
This paper will be less concerned with the
mechanics of preparing budgets in general or
the implementation of modern budgeting
practices as mentioned above than with the
process of decision-making pertaining to the
sources and uses of funds to be allocated for
specific municipal tasks and projects. Following
this introduction, the next section presents a
simple theory of municipal-level budgeting; a
modified Leontief model is used to consider local
revenues as financial inputs and local
expenditures as financial outputs. Conceptual
measures of the degree of local autonomy
associated with municipal budgeting processes
are presented.
2. A LEONTIEF
BUDGETING

MODEL

OF

LOCAL

What characteristics of municipal budgeting
suggest the usefulness of a Leontief-type
approach? Municipal budgets consist of diverse
receipts and expenditures. Because in transition
governments few of the revenue sources are
“own revenue” sources, municipal officers are
bound to accept transferred revenues with a
commitment to honor the specified expenditure
obligations attached to them. Such funds come
not only from the central government, but since
the process of accession to the EU began
(culminating successfully in 2004), from the
European Union as well.
This model is designed to show the sources of
revenues and measure the extent to which
municipal budget officers are constrained to
expend transferred budget funds or grants in
specific ways. Interestingly, gaining access to
European Union regional development funds is
expected in the Czech Republic to increase
related municipal expenditures. It will be
necessary for the cash-hungry municipalities
and regions of both republics to take credits to
take advantage of EU programs. Increased
municipal debt will be required to generate the
matching funds involved (Eliáš, 2003). Banking
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sector estimates forecasted a twofold growth of
debt finance. In 2003, the year prior to the EU
accession, local debt grew by 70 billion CZK
(2.95 billion USD), with the debt of Prague alone
representing nearly half of that sum (33.5 billion
CZK or 1.41 billion USD).
The simple model used in this paper to consider
these budget relationships is in the spirit of the
more complex methodological approach of
Iwamura and Liu (1998), which uses integer
programming to model capital budgeting
problems. The interest here requires a less
ambitious technique to account for the interplay
between expenditures and receipts and the
fiscal constraints associated with the spending
mandates of grants and transfers. We begin by
assuming two categories of budget receipts:
1) receipts from various tax revenue transfers,
grants from the center, or grants from the EU,
i.e., the basic municipal revenues, Yn,
2) receipts from “own revenues,” ORn, usually in
the form of property tax, local user fees, or
receipts from privatized municipal properties and
assets. These are exceptionally small shares of
total revenue in the Czech Republic and have
been small but growing in the Slovak Republic.

A first potential measure of municipal autonomy
would be the ratio of mandated expenditures to
the total of funds spent. Mandated expenditures
would be any spending assignments which the
municipality receives from outside, either from
the center or from, for example, European Union
regional development programs, which specify
the purposes for the transferred funds
contractually or even in an informally binding
manner. This simple measure would sum the αs
representing mandated expenditures and divide
that total by total expenditures to determine the
ratio of assigned values to total expenditures.
As will be observed below, the Republic of
Slovakia recently increased the transfer of
shared taxes to its municipalities in a substantial
way, implying that these funds were to be spent
as determined by the municipalities. At the same
time, it mandated that those municipalities would
henceforth be responsible for funding and
administrating elementary education. Whether or
not the contractual arrangements are clear,
when additional funds are supplied in
conjunction with a new spending mandate, the
attached strings are apparent and one can
legitimately speak of informal spending
assignments.

Expenditure types are Xa, Xb, Xc, Xd, and Xn,
“other expenditures.” Xa may be expenditures
for education, Xb may be expenditures for public
health, Xc may be for roads, Xd for general
government administration and Xn for other
expenditures such as police protection, public
transport, and water and sewage. Let α be the
coefficient representing the mandated share of a
given total revenue source assigned or specified
by either the central government, national law,
or EU regulations to be spent for a given project.
Thus, α is an assigned value (AV) or budgeted
amount to be spent on a particular activity
expressed as a percent of a total revenue
source. A Slovak municipality may, for example,
plan to spend 40 per cent of the total amount of
personal income tax revenues transferred to it
by the center for elementary education, so that
α(Y1) = 40,000 SKK, where α = .4 and Y1 =
100,000 SKK.

Xa
Xb
Xc
Xd
Xn

The coefficient β represents the share of the
revenue source actually spent by the
municipality for a given activity. It is the chosen
expenditure (CE) level of the municipality, and
may deviate from the AV or α. The actual β will
reflect, though not necessarily with precision, the
preferences of the municipal authorities. A
matrix of local expenditures can be constructed
with budget receipts listed horizontally across
the top and with expenditure categories listed
vertically down the left-hand side of the matrix.
Reading downward in a given column we
observe the expenditures funded from the
revenue source listed at the top of that column.
Reading along any given row horizontally we
see the specific amounts spent on a particular
public service from various revenue sources,
appearing as below. Here, we have the matrix
conforming to central government intentions, the
coefficients representing the αs, or assigned
values (AVs).
Y2
Y3
Y4
OR1 OR2
Y1
α Y1= 0.3Y1
0.3Y4
0.7Y1 0.6Y2 0.2Y3
0.2Y3
0.6Y3 0.5 Y4
0.4Y2
0.2Y4
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A matrix can also be written showing |α - β|, the
differences between mandated spending and
the level of expenditures actually chosen by
local authorities. This assumes, of course, the
possibility that ccasionally a mandate will not be
contracted with precision, will not be fully
binding, or will be subject to imperfect
monitoring, any of which conditions will permit
some discretion on the part of recipient
municipalities. Adding the β values to Figure 1
would show the difference between mandated
allocations and the municipality’s chosen
expenditures level.

spend more on a public service than the center
mandates, as seen below.
In the absence of revealed local preferences, we
can gain less detailed but nevertheless helpful
information simply by looking at the Coefficient
of Compliance for the various categories of local
public expenditures.
We observe that in
instances where the center transfers untied or
non-mandated funds, it is essentially adopting
local preferences in the action, so that α is
assumed to be the same as β and the CC = 1.0.
Across all expenditure categories, this will raise

If we had perfect knowledge of local
preferences, or if local preferences were
revealed (and expressed as α’, the desired level
of expenditures for a particular task), we could
calculate the following values based on α, α’,
and β.
A coefficient of incongruity, CI = |α - α’|
A coefficient of compliance, CC = 1 - |α - β|, and
A coefficient of autonomy, CA = 1 - |β - α’|

Milquetoste
Intrepid
Median

α

β
0.4
0.4
0.4

α’
0.4
0.1
.25

β
0.2
0.5
.35

α’
0.5
0.5
0.5

the average CC.
In general, this simple methodology is interested
in finding a matrix of the absolute values of the
differences between coefficients of assigned
values and chosen expenditures,
|α - β|.
The absolute values of these
differences, |γ| = Σ(AV-CE) + Σ(CE-AV),
declines as autonomy increases. We have no
measurement of the Coefficient of Autonomy as
defined above, but can only measure differences
as expressed in the Coefficient of Compliance.

At first blush, the coefficient of autonomy may
appear contradictory, since it emphasizes a
difference
between
chosen
municipal
expenditures and actual preferences. But the
two values will on occasion actually diverge,
since local officials may feel pressured or
actually be constrained to choose levels of
expenditures they do not prefer. Assume three
different municipal administrations characterized
as Milquetoste, Intrepid and Median. All have
the same preferences in the face of a particular
α mandate from the center, but the first
conforms perfectly to the mandate, the second is
at complete defiance, and the third is between
the two extremes. The coefficients use absolute
values because the local administration may
want to spend either more or less from a
particular revenue source than the center
mandates, as can be seen by the following
simple example.

Milquetoste
Intrepid
Median

α
0.2
0.2
0.2

In summary, we have [αij] - [βij] = |γij| where [αij]
is a matrix of the coefficients of spending
mandates. These are rules for the use of
transferred funds or state grants. The matrix
represents
available,
constrained
funds
designated for essential spending programs or
projects. Planned spending is represented here
as a share of a total expenditures budget, which
could also be viewed as an average of spending
among similar communities. [βij] is a matrix of
actual municipal spending choices. It represents
the actual sum spent for a program or project.
[γij] is a matrix of differences between mandated
CT
0.1
0.1
0.1

CC
0.3
0.3
0.3

CA
1.0
0.7
.85

0.7
1.0
.85

and actual expenditures.
We would get the same results, of course, if we
had values reflecting municipal preferences to
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3. CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS
Treating local finance as a matter of revenue
inputs and expenditure outputs perceives local
finance as a response of municipal officials to
their own budgeting preferences. These
preferences must take account, of course, of the
demands of constituents as well as the financial
constraints imposed by granting authorities
whose modus operandi is frequently to transfer
funds with spending mandates attached. As a
result, actual spending patterns will not perfectly
reflect the preferences of the local officials, since
they would sometimes prefer to do things that
they perceive they cannot do and in fact avoid
doing. Nor are local preferences necessarily
revealed preferences. We have the public record
only of actual revenues and expenditures, which
may not perfectly reflect either local preferences
or even transferred spending mandates.
Empirical analyses of municipal budgets would,
therefore, be very difficult to perform, although
we would welcome the results of such and
efforts to develop empirical analyses are to be
recommended for future research.
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